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Abstract
The economic analysis of organized crime suggests that some economic activities
are particularly vulnerable to penetration by criminal organizations. This paper
provides an analysis of the structure of the Sicilian economy and shows that, when
compared to other Italian regions, it is characterized by a disproportionate presence
of such activities. In particular, the economy of Sicily appears characterized by: (i)
a large dimension of traditional sectors, such as the Construction sector, which also
has a strong territorial specificity; (ii) a large presence of small firms; (iii) a low
level of technology; (iii) a large public sector. The joint presence of these features
creates fertile soil for the typical activities of organized crime, such as extortion and
cartel enforcement. Hence, we propose an alternative explanation of the persistence
of organized crime with respect to explanations based on cultural and social factors.
Keywords: Organized Crime, Economic Structure, Sicilian Mafia, Economic
Development.
1 Introduction
Organized crime is still remarkably active in Italy, especially in the Southern regions of
Campania, Apulia, Calabria and Sicily. The recent survey by Censis (2007) reports that
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about 77% of resident population in these regions (about 13 million people) lives in towns
in which the presence of organized crime is recorded.
This paper aims to contribute to the explanation of the diffusion and persistence
of organized crime. In particular, it analyzes the relationship between the structure of
the economy in Sicily and the diffusion of organized crime, building on some insights
from the economic analysis of criminal organizations.1 Our empirical analysis shows
that the Sicilian economy, compared to the economy of other Italian regions, appears
particularly vulnerable to penetration from organized crime, being characterized by: (i) a
relatively high shares of traditional sectors and economic activities strongly related to the
territory, like the Construction sector; (ii) a relatively small firm’s size, (iii) a relatively
low technological level and, (iii) a large dimension of the public sector. The joint presence
of these characteristics, as the theory suggests, makes the economy fertile soil for the
propagation of typical activities performed by criminal organization, like extortion and
cartel enforcement, the latter being particularly important in the adjudication of public
works.
These results provide an alternative explanation to theories on the persistence of orga-
nized crime based on cultural and social factors (see e.g. Putnam (1993), pp. 146-148), and
may also be relevant for studies on transplantation of organized crime ( Varese (2006)).
Indeed, the evidence provided in Varese (2006) is consistent with the thesis of this paper.
A territory may favor the diffusion of organized crime when the structure of its economy
have certain characteristics. The economy of Bardonecchia, a city in Northern Italy where
organized crime from Calabria successfully entrenched, was heavily based on Construction
at the time of transplantation. On the contrary, the economy of Verona, another city in
Northern Italy where the entrenchment failed, was more based on hi-tech, export-oriented
firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical background;
Section 3 contains the results of the empirical analysis; Section 4 concludes.
1Part of the results in this paper are in Lavezzi (2008). With respect to Lavezzi (2008), the theoretical
framework has been thoroughly re-elaborated, new data have been considered, and the empirical analysis
has been strengthened by several tests on the statistical significance of the results.
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2 Theory
The seminal contributions of Schelling (1967) and Schelling (1971) provide an analysis
of the economic activities which, for their characteristics, can more easily fall under the
control of organized crime. This requires a preliminary definition of the goals of the
criminal organization.
According to Schelling (1967), p. 182, criminal organizations such as the Sicilian Mafia
can be compared to governments in the sense that, like governments: “organized crime
... seeks not only influence, but exclusive influence ... or at least a stable jurisdictional
sharing with other authorities.” (emphasis added). In fact, the activities of government
and control, typically performed by the State, imply the definition of rules, the settlement
of conflicts, the imposition of discipline, etc. Thus, these activities must necessarily be
performed under a monopoly regime in order to be effective.2 These characteristics are
clearly traceable in the Sicilian Mafia: “in Sicily there is a clear geographic division;
individual families have specific areas in which they have the sole operating authority”
( Gambetta and Reuter (1995), p. 119).
The actions undertaken by organized crime to reach its goals of controlling and gov-
erning take different shapes. In particular, with respect to the control of the economy,
the Mafia: (i) practices extortion, and (ii) plays the role of cartel enforcer. Both activities
have an important common economic consequence: they reduce competition.3 Let us
pause on the description of these activities and on their consequences.
As for extortion, firms pay the Mafia in order to remain active on the market. From
this point of view, firms “buy protection” ( Gambetta (1993)) in principle from other
organizations but, in practice, first and foremost from the criminal organization itself,
which may credibly threat to cause damages, economic and personal, to the firms refusing
to pay ( Schelling (1971), p. 185).
Besides extortion, the Mafia also plays the more complex activity of enforcer of col-
2Indeed, in actual situations there are no territories where two jurisdictions apply.
3Although unified by this aspect, in the present discussion we keep the two activities separated as
there is at least an important difference: extortion does not necessarily imply some kind of interaction
(e.g. strategic) among the firms involved, as is typically the case of firms belonging to the various cartels
overseen by the Mafia.
3
lusive agreements, which are particularly relevant in public procurement. For exam-
ple, Gambetta and Reuter (1995), pp. 124-125, describe the mechanism by which cartel
members agree in advance on the firm which will adjudicate the public work, and make fic-
titiously high offers to let the chosen one prevail. This occurs within a broader agreement
on the rotation of cartel firms in the adjudication of public contracts. The enforcement
of the agreements is guaranteed by the organization, which levies a “tribute” on the
participating firms.4
In both cases the payment to the organization appears as a price paid by the firms in
order to reduce competition.5 This is more apparent in the case of the cartels, in which
firms buy a privileged position with respect to outsiders.6 However, also in the case of
extortion where coercion appears more important, it cannot be excluded that the money
paid is part of an agreement by which the firm buys protection not only from possible
damages, but also from possible competitors.
Gambetta (1993) discusses at length instances in which payments to the criminal
organization appear voluntary. For example, he argues that potential entrants in a market
can be considered as extorted, if they wanted to enter. On the contrary, incumbents: “pay
for protection ... to deter new competitors” ( Gambetta (1993), p. 32).7 In any case,
although the dividing line between coercion and will cannot always be easily drawn,
the payment of protection money represents a de facto reduction in competition as it
4Cartels of firms may not be strictly related to public works, as in the case of the fish market in
Palermo described in Gambetta (1993), pp. 202-206.
5Note that, in both contexts, being a monopolist on the part of the organization is essential. In
the case of extortion, monopolistic power is crucial because: “large-scale systematic extortion cannot
really stand competition any more than can a local taxing authority” ( Schelling (1971), p. 185). In
the case of cartel enforcement, since the activity clearly requires the mentioned features of “control” and
“government”, it cannot but be exclusive.
6For a detailed discussion on the types of cartel that may involve a criminal organization, see e.g.
Alexander (1997).
7 Gambetta (1993), p. 199, reports a declaration of a firm partner from Palermo: “The least those
who protect you can do is offer to discourage competitors should they want to enter your territory”.
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constitutes a barrier to entry for firms unwilling to pay.8
Once recognized the main consequences of criminal control over economic activities,
in particular on the level of competition, there remains the task of identifying the causes
that make some activities more easily subjected to control and monopolization, which
represents the main focus of this paper (but reduction in competition will be recalled
later).
Let us consider the characteristics that, cœteris paribus, make a firm more likely to
become victim of extortion. Following Fiorentini (2000), we can claim that the probability
of being extorted is higher:9
1. the higher the difficulty of obtaining protection from others organizations or insti-
tutions, as is the case of firms operating in areas in which legal institutions are weak
or corrupted;10
2. the higher the observability of output and profits, which makes more difficult for the
firm to hide these magnitudes and potentially escape from the payment of protection
money;
3. the higher the territorial specificity of the firm’s assets, given the importance of
control on territorial basis typically exerted by the organization;
4. the higher the capacity to transfer the payment of the tribute on the final price,
8 Gambetta (1993), p. 20, describes another instance of voluntary payments to the Mafia: “protection
money may be willingly paid” by individuals engaged in economic transactions where parties do not trust
each other. In this case the mafioso can provide insurance against opportunistic behavior.
9In what follows we list arguments related to legal firms, and arguments related to illegal businesses
that can be relevant for legal activities too.
10Italy is in general a country in which institutions are weak at ensuring law enforcement. For example,
the World Bank (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance) assigns to Italy in 2005 the score of 0.51, referred
to the interval (−2.5, 2.5), for the indicator “rule of law”, which provides information on: “the extent to
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” ( Kaufman et al.
(2006), p. 4). This places Italy at the seventyfourth position in the world. To the best of my knowledge
no such indicators exist at regional level, although there exists widespread consensus that the overall
institutional quality of regions in Southern Italy is poorer than in the North (see, e.g. Leonardi (2002)).
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hence the lower is the level of competition (which, as remarked, is in any case
endogenously reduced by the presence of extortionary practices);
5. the smaller the dimension of the firm, as this implies a lower number of employees
and, therefore, a lower probability that extortion is revealed outside the firm and,
in addition, as: “in large organizations too many people have to sign the checks,
initial the vouchers, audit the books, scrutinize budgets, take inventory ... The
small independent entrepreneur ... would be more able to meet the demands than
a complex organization would be” ( Schelling (1971), p. 182).
Instead, following Gambetta and Reuter (1995), we can list the factors that make
more probable the formation of cartels enforced by the criminal organization:
1. the higher the territorial characterization of the economic activity, like that of firms
belonging to the sectors of “construction, transport, and street-hawkers” ( Gambetta
and Reuter (1995), p. 122), for the mentioned necessity of controlling the territory;
2. the higher the possibility for cartel members to share the clients. An example is
represented by suppliers of the Public Administration, in which firm X supplies
schools, firm Y supplies hospitals, etc;11
3. the higher is the possibility, if clients are not numerous and therefore sharing them
is not viable, to create “queues” among the cartel firms, for instance to supply the
same client repetitively in time. The Public Administration can be quoted as a case
of a unique client which can be supplied by many firms in time, for instance because
it can contract out different works, services, etc, following the procedure described
above.
It can be immediately noted an overlapping among the two series of characteristics
concerning the importance of the “territorial” aspect of the economic activity.12 Moreover,
11“Relative to private customers, public institutions are fewer, take out longer-term contracts, buy
fixed quantities, are generally slack about quality, careless about price and corruptible. In short, they
are easy to share” ( Gambetta and Reuter (1995), pp. 123-124).
12The most obvious candidate in this respect is the Construction sector. Kelly (1999), pp. 90-95,
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as an implication, it is possible to conjecture that the technological level of firms which
are more likely to suffer Mafia conditioning will be low, as low will be the skill level of
workers.
In fact, a high technological level can make monitoring of the activity problematic,
and is typically associated to relatively complex organizational structures and/or rela-
tively high dimensions (for instance due to the fixed R&D costs). As Reuter (1987), p.
7, points out: “Racketeers are not believed to be influential in industries containing large
corporations or involving high technology. Rather, they are influential in those essen-
tially local activities where small, family-based enterprises are particularly important.”
In addition, a small firm size is typically associated to little investments in human capital
in the form of on-the-job training (see, e.g., ISTAT (1996) on Italy), and this can limit
the absorption of new technologies as human capital is an important pre-requisite for the
introduction of hi-tech capital, as remarked since the seminal contribution of Nelson e
Phelps (1966).
Finally, as noted, it appears that the presence of the public sector can be associated
to the emergence of economic activities desirable by the Mafia, a point generally found in
the economic literature on corruption: “The greater the presence of the state, the greater
is the potential for corruption” ( Del Monte e Papagni (1998), p. 380).
As a consequence, it is possible to sketch the profile of the firm type whose diffusion
can favor the propagation of Mafia conditioning on the economic activity. This firm will
be:
1. small;
2. belonging to traditional and/or low-tech sectors;
3. engaged in activities strongly related to the territory;
4. active in an area where the public sector is large (and legal institutions are weak).
discusses other aspects making the Construction sector permeable to organized crime with respect to
the experience of the US. Schneider and Schneider (2003), pp. 90-91, point out that the Construction
sector is also tightly linked to the public sector, and therefore represents an ideal target for criminal
organizations.
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In the light of this line of reasoning, in Section 3 we present the results of an empirical
analysis of the structure of the Sicilian economy, in order to evaluate if and to what extent
it presents those characteristics that make it vulnerable to the propagation of organized
crime, with respect to other Italian regions.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we present an empirical analysis of the Sicilian economy divided in two
parts:
1. analysis of the recent dynamics of per capita income and labor productivity;
2. analysis of the structure of the economy in terms of:
• sectoral composition of employment;
• firm size;
• technological level.
3.1 On the Recent Dynamics of the Sicilian Economy
Figures 1 and 2 respectively report the dynamics of per capita GVA and labor productivity
(per worker GVA), measured with respect to the Italian average.13 We compare Sicily
(SIC) to the average of Center-North regions (CN), Lombardy (LOM, which represents
the most dynamic region), to the average of the other Southern regions (SOUTH), and to
the average of Southern regions in which the presence of organized crime is not pervasive
(SOUTH*).14
13Data are from the CRENOS database (http://www.crenos.it). They cover the period 1970-2004 and
are expressed at 1995 constant prices. These data are based on official ISTAT (Italian national statistical
institute) statistics but, compared to them, offer regional time series at a more disaggregated level. In
what follows we consider the period 1970-1994, for a not complete comparability of the 1970-1994 e 1995-
2004 subperiods. Our findings are not substantially altered by the analysis of the subperiod 1995-2004.
For simplicity, we will indicate the dimension of the labor force with “employed”, instead of “units of
labor”, which refer to numbers of equivalent full-time employed. All computations in this paper have been
performed in R (www.r-project.org); codes and data are available at: http://www.unipa.it/∼lavezzi.
14See Appendix A for the list of regions and sectors, and the composition of the macroregions.
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Figure 1: Per capita GVA: 1970-1994
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
1.
4
years
pe
r w
or
ke
r G
VA
 (r
ela
tiv
e t
o I
tal
ian
 av
era
ge
)
LOM
CN
SOUTH
SOUTH*
SIC
Figure 2: Per worker GVA: 1970-1994
In the context of the well-known Italian economic dualism, with the regions in the
North-Center outperforming the regions in the South especially in terms of per capita
GVA, the economy of Sicily is located at the bottom of the distribution in terms of per
capita GVA, while its performance in terms of labor productivity appears slightly better.15
Note that the macroregion of SOUTH* performs better than the macroregion of SOUTH,
and that LOM clearly stands out as the richest and most productive region.
This preliminary part of the analysis reveals that, on aggregate, the Sicilian economy
in the period considered is characterized by substantial backwardness with respect to
other Italian regions. This contributes to setting the stage for the subsequent analysis
but, at first sight, it could also be considered as part of the explanation of the diffusion
of organized crime, in a chain of reasoning that goes from economic backwardness to the
diffusion of organized crime, through the institutional weakness associated to poverty.16
15The higher cross-regional dispersion in terms of per capita GVA depends on the different em-
ployed/population ratios between Northern and Southern Italy. For example, between 1970 and 1994 the
ratio employed/population ratio in Sicily was about 30%, while in the regions with the highest levels of
per capita GVA it was about 50%.
16The idea that the level of economic development is a fundamental prerequisite for a high institutional
quality is commonly indicated as the “modernization” hypothesis. See, e.g. Putnam (1993), pp. 83-86,
for a discussion on institutional quality in Italian regions and some caveats on this reasoning. We will
return on the issue of causality in Section 4.
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In what follows we propose a more disaggregated study in order to highlight that, from an
economic point of view, what can be relevant to favor the diffusion of organized crime is
the structure of the economy, and not only its relative state of backwardness. In fact, the
structure of the economy may be the common factor causing poverty and the diffusion of
organized crime.
3.2 On the Structure of the Sicilian Economy
The analysis of the structure of the Sicilian economy is conducted through an analysis of:
(i) the sectoral distribution of the labor force, and of its evolution in the period considered;
(ii) the size distribution and (iii) the technological level of Sicilian firms. The comparison
will be conducted with respect to ITA, LOM, SOUTH, and SOUTH*.
3.2.1 Sectoral Employment Shares
Table 1 highlights the sectoral evolution of the labor force in the period 1970-1994.
10
ITA LOM SOUTH SOUTH* SIC
Sector 1970 1994 1970 1994 1970 1994 1970 1994 1970 1994
AG 23.67 8.74 6.33 3.40 36.24 13.54 37.88 12.53 30.10 12.86
EN 2.71 2.03 5.00 3.10 1.48 1.76 1.53 2.01 1.32 1.63
MI1 1.73 1.41 1.32 0.70 1.50 1.24 1.57 1.41 1.56 1.78
MI2 7.03 6.73 20.04 13.13 2.39 4.75 1.78 4.94 2.76 3.60
MI3 2.15 2.27 2.57 2.54 1.87 2.09 1.80 2.37 1.75 0.90
MI4 5.31 3.95 10.64 6.94 2.91 2.51 2.52 2.49 2.66 1.40
MI5 0.90 0.94 2.47 2.30 0.42 0.53 0.40 0.59 0.43 0.20
MI6 2.99 2.92 5.08 4.30 1.72 1.89 1.59 2.01 2.03 1.24
Tot M 20.12 18.22 42.12 29.91 10.80 13.01 9.67 13.8 11.20 9.12
C 10.67 7.56 7.99 6.55 12.87 8.44 12.91 9.13 12.90 7.79
MS1 16.37 21.04 16.26 19.46 13.99 19.39 13.7 19.02 17.56 19.75
MS2 4.64 6.13 4.10 5.71 3.71 5.16 3.50 5.35 4.72 5.60
MS3 0.99 1.80 1.58 3.01 0.61 1.32 0.58 1.30 0.83 1.72
MS4 3.34 7.58 4.00 9.30 2.98 7.19 2.56 6.79 3.37 8.09
Tot MS 25.33 36.55 25.93 37.47 21.29 33.06 20.35 32.47 26.48 35.16
NMS 17.50 26.91 12.63 19.57 17.33 30.20 17.67 30.08 18.00 33.44
Table 1: Structural change, 1970:1994
Table 1 shows that: 1) the typical process of structural change takes place in Italy,
as the weight of the agricultural sector declines with respect to Manufacturing and Ser-
vices;17 2) this tendency is particularly remarkable in LOM; 3) in SOUTH, and especially
SOUTH*, we witness on the contrary an expansion of the manufacturing sector which,
however, does not reach levels comparable with the national average.
With respect to these broad tendencies, Sicily presents the following characteristics:
1. the share of employment in agriculture in 1994 is still relatively high with respect to
ITA and LOM, but in line with SOUTH and SOUTH*. It is true, however, that the
share in Agriculture in Sicily was 43% of the its level in 1970, so that it decreased
at a slower pace than in SOUTH and, in particular, SOUTH*, in which the shares
in 1994 are respectively 37% and 33% of their initial level.
17In Table 1 we indicate the total for the manufacturing sector and market services with, respectively,
Tot M and Tot MS.
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2. In Sicily the employment share in Manufacturing appears particularly low and de-
creasing with respect to its initial level. This is in contrast with the tendency
observed in SOUTH and, in particular, in SOUTH*.18 The data on the manufac-
turing sector is relevant as, with respect for instance to other non-service sectors
such as Agriculture and Construction, this is the sector in which technological ad-
vances may take place more significantly,19 and because it is the crucial sector for
economic growth especially in the “take-off” stage where an economic structure
based on agriculture is gradually abandoned (see, e.g., Rostow (1960)).
3. The absolute size of the construction sector appears in line with the corresponding
values of the other macroregions and LOM but, with respect to the dimension of the
manufacturing sector, it appears strikingly large. The ratio between employment in
Construction and in Manufacturing in 1994 is, with respect to ITA, LOM, SOUTH,
SOUTH* and SIC: 0.42, 0.22, 0.65, 0.66, 0.85.
4. The public sector is remarkably larger than the national average and, in particular,
than the value for LOM. In addition, it is larger than the corresponding value in
SOUTH and SOUTH*.
Are these differences statistically significant? In order to answer this question, we run
the following regression:
SHAREi,r,t = α + β0(C · SIC) + β1SIC + γSECT+ δYEAR+ ǫi,r,t, (1)
where SHAREi,r,t is the employment share of sector i, in region r in year t, C is a dummy
variable indicating sectors more favorable to crime, SIC is a dummy for Sicily, SECT
and YEAR are, respectively, vectors of sectoral and calendar year dummies, ǫi,r,t is the
disturbance term.
18For a concise description of the dynamics of the manufacturing sector in Sicily in this period, see,
e.g., Helg et al. (2000).
19For example, ISTAT data show that the average incidence of investment in software on total gross
fixed investment for the period 1970-1994 is, respectively for Agriculture, Manufacturing and Construc-
tion, 0.1%, 1.99% and 1.52%. If the analysis is restricted to recent years, to be compatible with the
discussion on technology in Section 3.2.3, these values amount to: 0.12%, 3.52% and 1.21%.
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Before presenting the results, some explanation the specification of Eq. (1) is needed.
The hypothesis in this paper is that, where the structure of the economy is biased towards
certain sectors then organized crime, cœteris paribus, should be more pervasive. Hence,
the structure of the economy should be included among the explanatory variables of
organized crime diffusion. However, running a regression to directly capture this effect
is complicated by the problem of obtaining the dependent variable, that is of measuring
organized crime.20
Hence, in Eq. (1) the supposedly high pervasiveness of organized crime in Sicily with
respect to other regions is crudely measured by a dummy for Sicily, and this appears among
the explanatory variables of the sectoral employment shares. Eq. (1), therefore, represents
a tool to evaluate the correlation between organized crime and economic structure (but
we will return on causality in Section 4). In particular, with this specification we aim at
evaluating the robustness of the correlation between crime and employment shares and,
therefore, include a number of dummies to capture possible omitted factors. The crucial
coefficient in Eq. (1) is β0: if positive and statistically significant, it would indicate that
there exists a robust positive correlation between pervasiveness of organized crime and
the size of the “crime sectors’. Table 2 contains the results.21
20For example, in studies of convergence among Italian regions, some authors include a variable among
the regressors in order to capture the effect of organized crime on the low growth of Southern regions
(e.g., Tullio and Quarella (1999) utilize the number of murders). However, the intensity of specific crimes
does not necessarily proxy for the pervasiveness of organized crime. A pervasive organized crime does
not imply a high frequency of, e.g., violent crimes and, in addition, some crimes such as extortion may
be severely underreported in the official statistics. The measurement of organized crime would therefore
require a specific study, which goes beyond the purposes of this paper
21Our benchmark sector is MI2 in 1994.
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Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb IVa IVb
βˆ0 0.0359
(0.0043)
*** 0.0349
(0.0183)
* 0.0410
(0.0048)
*** 0.0425
(0.0202)
** 0.0239
(0.0048)
*** 0.0199
(0.0203)
0.0294
(0.0056)
*** 0.0277
(0.0237)
year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
crime dummy CRIME1 CRIME1 CRIME2 CRIME2 CRIME3 CRIME3 CRIME4 CRIME4
no. obs. 7.000 560 7.000 560 7.000 560 7.000 560
adj. R2 0.78 0.71 0.78 0.71 0.78 0.71 0.78 0.71
Table 2: Estimation Eq. (1). Period of observation: 1970-1994. Regressions “a” utilize all data,
regressions “b” utilize data from 1970 and 1994. Dependent variable: employment share. Standard
errors in parenthesis. The symbols *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. CRIME1: dummy for
sectors 1, 9, 10, 14. CRIME2: dummy for sectors 1, 9, 14. CRIME3: dummy for sectors 9, 10, 14.
CRIME4: dummy for sectors 9, 14.
From Table 2 we note that, when the whole variability in the data is exploited, the
estimated value of β0 is always positive and highly statistically significant.
22 The result is
robust to different definitions of the “crime” sectors.23 When we consider only the initial
and final year, we still obtain the predicted sign, although the parameter is measured
more imprecisely.24
22Omitting the time dummies leaves the results unaffected.
23We considered as “crime” sectors, trying different combinations, first of all Construction and Non
Market Services. In addition, we considered Agriculture, as a proxy of the relevance of “traditional”
economic activities and Trade, Hotels and Public Establishment, as a service sector likely to be charac-
terized by a low technological level, especially in contrast to Credit and Insurance where the skill and
technological level are likely to be higher.
24Is this effect specific to Sicily or does it represent a tendency for the whole South? Reading Table 1
suggests that the differences in the economic structure we are discussing may actually characterize the
South with respect to the rest of Italy. To answer these questions, we ran different specifications of Eq.
(1) adding dummy variables for sets of Southern regions (e.g. all Southern regions or SOUTH* regions),
also as interactive terms with the “crime” dummy. Results (not reported) show that, with all data:
when we use the dummy CRIME3, (i) the coefficient βˆ0 is still positive and significant, (ii) βˆ0 is higher
than the coefficient for (C · SOUTH*), and a null of equality between the two coefficients is strongly
rejected. This indicates that, with respect to a possible effect from regions in the South, Sicily has a
differential effect and that, in particular, its effect is higher with respect to SOUTH* regions. When we
use CRIME4, βˆ0 is positive but marginally significant (p-value is 13%); it is statistically significant and
higher than the coefficient for (C · SOUTH*), but we cannot reject a null hypothesis of equality of the
two coefficients (p-value of test of equality is 32%). In both cases, with data from only 1970 and 1994,
14
As a further test, we estimated Eq. (2):
∆SHAREi,r = α + ψSHAREi,r,1970 + β0(C · SIC) + β1SIC + γSECT+ ǫi,r, (2)
where ∆SHAREi,r is the variation in the share of sector i in region r between 1970 and
1994. The coefficient β0, if positive, indicates by how much the dimension of “crime”
sectors relatively increased more (or decreased less). The control for the initial share
takes into account the differences in the initial structure and, if the estimated value of ψ
is negative, it would indicate a tendency to convergence in the structure of the regional
economies. Plus, the use of the difference between 1970 and 1994 removes possible regional
fixed effects, such as culture and social capital that could be relevant to the present
analysis.25
I II III IV
βˆ0 0.0171
(0.0099)
* 0.0286
(0.0109)
** 0.0156
(0.0109)
0.0322
(0.0127)
**
crime dummy CRIME1 CRIME2 CRIME3 CRIME4
no. obs. 280 280 280 280
adj. R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Table 3: Estimation Eq. (2). Period of observation: 1970-1994. Dependent variable: variation of
employment share between 1970 and 1994. Standard errors in parenthesis. The symbols *, ** denote
significance at 10% and 5%. CRIME1: dummy for sectors 1, 9, 10, 14. CRIME2: dummy for sectors 1,
9, 14. CRIME3: dummy for sectors 9, 10, 14. CRIME4: dummy for sectors 9, 14.
Results in Table 3 show that, controlling for the initial share level, there exists evi-
dence that “crime” sectors in Sicily had a relatively higher increase (or a relatively lower
decline) with respect to the rest of Italy, as βˆ0 is always positive and most of the times sig-
nificant. The estimated values of ψ (not reported) are always negative and significantly
different from zero, indicating a broad tendency to convergence in employment shares
the differential effect is positive but not significant, as well as the difference with respect to the coefficient
for (C · SOUTH*). These results reinforce those in Table 2 and suggest that, when we focus on share
levels, including Agriculture in the “crime” dummy may not be entirely appropriate.
25Eq. (2) is obtained assuming that the equation for the employment shares in 1994 contains the initial
conditions, i.e. shares in 1970, among the explanatory variables, while the effect of initial conditions in
the equation for the shares in 1970 is absorbed by the intercept.
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across regions. Our result show that, however, in this process some sectors display a sig-
nificantly different path and, for our purposes, this indicates that convergence in sectoral
shares is associated to a bias in favor of “crime” sectors in Sicily.26 Overall, we find that
the correlation between the diffusion of organized crime in Sicily and the structure of the
Sicilian economy appears robust.
3.2.2 On Firms’ Size Distribution
Figure 3 and Table 4 represent the firms’ distribution by size (measured by the number
of employees), based on data from ISTAT (2001).27
Size classes
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Figure 3: Firms’ size distribution, 2001
# of emp. ITA LOM SOUTH SOUTH* SIC
1 58.32 56.60 63.18 61.05 65.37
2 17.70 17.48 15.99 16.77 15.50
3-5 14.51 14.38 12.94 13.81 12.53
6-9 4.70 5.18 4.10 4.36 3.64
10-15 2.34 2.94 1.93 2.02 1.56
16-19 0.69 0.89 0.55 0.58 0.43
20-49 1.22 1.65 0.95 1.00 0.71
50-99 0.31 0.48 0.23 0.25 0.17
100-199 0.12 0.23 0.09 0.10 0.06
200-249 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
250-499 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02
500-999 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
≥1000 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4: Firms’ size distribution, 2001: nu-
merical values
26We carried out tests similar to those described in Footnote 24. We find that: (i) the differential
coefficient for Sicily with respect to a dummy for Southern regions is always positive but not significant
(with CRIME2 the p-value is 0.11); (ii) the coefficient for Sicily is always higher than the one for SOUTH*
regions, and a test of equality of their difference is rejected at 5% with CRIME2 (while with CRIME1 the
p-value of test of equality is 0.13.). These result are consistent with the remark on the slower reduction
of the Agricultural employment share in Sicily.
27 ISTAT (2001) contains data for the following sectors: Industry, Commerce, Other Services.
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I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
intercept 0.5832
(0.0114)
*** 0.5548
(0.0096)
*** 0.5548
(0.0084)
*** 0.6730
(0.0139)
*** 0.63022
(0.0179)
*** 0.6233
(0.0213)
*** 0.7482
(0.0263)
*** 0.7142
(0.0762)
*** 0.6598
(0.0807)
***
SIC 0.0705
(0.0512)
0.02190
(0.0354)
SOUTH 0.0769
(0.0158)
*** 0.04138
(0.01334)
*** 0.0158
(0.0333)
SOUTHC 0.1037
(0.0168)
*** 0.0510
(0.0205)
** 0.0554
(0.0404)
SOUTH* 0.0556
(0.0168)
*** 0.0388
(0.0142)
** 0.0198
(0.0320)
FINDEP −0.0025
(0.0003)
*** −0.0017
(0.0004)
*** −0.0016
(0.0004)
***
GVA99 −0.0106
(0.0017)
*** −0.0088
(0.0042)
* −0.0058
(0.0044)
no. obs 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
adj R2 0.04 0.58 0.67 0.71 0.80 0.80 0.67 0.66 0.69
Table 5: Correlates of firms’ size distribution. Dependent variable: share of firms in Size Class I.
SOUTH is a dummy for southern regions, including Sicily; SOUTHC is a dummy for southern regions
where organized crime is pervasive; SOUTH* is a dummy for southern regions where organized crime is not
pervasive; GVA99 is per capita GVA in 1999; FINDEP is the measure of regional financial development
proposed by Guiso et al. (2004). The symbols *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.
It is possible to observe that Sicily has, on average, a lower frequencies of firms in each
dimensional class but in the first, which includes firms with one employee.28 This holds
not only with respect to Italy or Lombardy, but also with respect to SOUTH* which,
although marginally, has a firm size distribution skewed towards the highest dimensional
classes.
Table 5 summarizes the results of various regressions run to test the significance of the
difference between firms’ size distribution in Sicily and in other regions, also with respect
to other possible correlates.29 In particular, we proxy the firms’ size distribution by the
share of firms in Size Class I, and use it a the dependent variable.
In Table 5, Models I-III only consider dummy variables. Model I show that the coef-
ficient for Sicily is positive, but not statistically significant (the p-value is 0.18). Hence,
Sicily does not seem to have a specific effect.30 However, from Models II and III there
28Data in Figure 3 are presented on a logarithmic scale in order to provide a better visual representation
of low frequencies. The vertical axis, however, reports the actual frequency values.
29Tables 5 and 12 are based on OLS cross-section regressions with only one observation per region.
Coefficients should be interpreted, for the reasons explained, as indicators of correlations.
30This result holds in general, so we omit the dummy for Sicily in the regressions that follow.
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appears a significant difference between Southern regions and the rest. In particular,
regions in the south have a higher share of very small firms, but a difference emerges be-
tween SOUTH* regions and regions where organized crime is widespread, the latter being
characterized by a larger share of very small firms. A test of equality of the coefficients
for SOUTHC and SOUTH* is rejected at 5% level of confidence.
In regressions IV-IX we add two possible variables that may correlate with the firm
size:31 the measure of financial development proposed in Guiso et al. (2004), and the level
of per capita GVA in 1999 (the year in which data from ISTAT (2001) where collected), as
a more general proxy for economic development. In particular, a higher level of financial
development, cœteris paribus, should be associated to a higher firm size, as firms should
be less credit constrained and therefore more capable of growing in regions where financial
development is higher.
In Models IV-VI we observe that the coefficient of financial development is, as pre-
dictable, negative and significant. The regional dummies remain significant, albeit at
a somewhat lower level. The difference between SOUTH* regions and the other south-
ern regions remain with respect to the intercept, but we cannot reject the hypothesis of
equality of the coefficients.
Finally, Models VII-IX show that the pattern in firms’ size we are discussing is likely to
be an aspect of the difference in economic development that exists in general. The regional
dummies become non significant, albeit preserving their sign and relative magnitudes.32
To sum up, we find that there exists a significant difference between Southern Italy and
the other regions in terms of the share of firms in Size Class I, that we use to proxy for the
skewness of the firms’ size distribution in favor of small firms. In this general tendency, we
find some evidence that a further difference between SOUTH* regions and those where
organized crime is pervasive is likely to exist, but the small dataset we used does not
allow us to make stronger claims. This result appears as a part of the broad difference in
the level of development between North and South regions (we defer to Section 4 further
31To preserve degrees of freedom, we consider them separately.
32Results in Table 5 are essentially confirmed if we proxy for the firms’ size distribution by the average
firm size, computed by the frequencies at various size classes multiplied for the central value of the class
size (or class XIII, which is open, we arbitrarily set the value to 2000).
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discussion).
The following section focuses on the productivity dynamics over the period considered,
aiming at providing more detailed information than the aggregate data presented in Figure
2, and on the technological level of Sicilian firms.
3.2.3 On Productivity Dynamics and Technology
A starting point to evaluate aggregate productivity dynamics with respect to the sec-
toral productivity dynamics can be the shift-share analysis. This type of exercise allows
measuring how much the aggregate growth rate of productivity depends on productiv-
ity increases at sectoral level or on reallocation of workers across sectors and, therefore,
connects the analyses of productivity and structural change, also providing preliminary
information on the technological level characterizing the Sicilian economy.
Formally, aggregate productivity is decomposed as in Eq. (3):
y =
Y
L
=
∑
i
Yi
L
=
∑
i
Yi
Li
·
Li
L
=
∑
i
yi · wi (3)
where y is aggregate productivity, Y is total output, L is total employment, Yi, Li and yi
are respectively output, employment and productivity in sector i, and wi is the employ-
ment share in sector i.
Productivity variation over a period, ∆y, can be decomposed as in Eq. (4):33
∆y =
∑
j
∆yj · w¯j +
∑
j
∆wj · y¯j (4)
where ∆yj and ∆wj are variations over a period (1970-1994 in our case), and y¯j e w¯j are
the average values of productivity and of employment shares in sector j (the average being
simply computed between the initial and final values). In practice, the overall variation
appears as a weighted average of sectoral productivity variations in individual sectors,
weighted by the average employment shares, and of sectoral employment shares, weighted
by the average sectoral productivity level.
The first and second terms of Eq. (4) respectively indicate the productivity growth
effect, (PGE ), and share effect, (SE ). Tables 6-10 contain the results of the shift-share
33See, e.g., Bernard and Jones (1996).
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analysis for ITA, LOM, SOUTH, SOUTH* and SIC.34
Sector PGE %PGE SE %SE TE %TE
AG 0.31 11.23 -0.32 -11.25 -0.01 -0.02
EN -0.01 -0.35 -0.07 -2.36 -0.08 -2.72
MI1 0.06 2.30 -0.02 -0.74 0.04 1.56
MI2 0.25 9.04 -0.01 -0.45 0.24 8.59
MI3 0.08 2.82 0 0.14 0.08 2.96
MI4 0.12 4.46 -0.04 -1.51 0.08 2.94
MI5 0.05 1.63 0 0.07 0.05 1.70
MI6 0.09 3.16 0 -0.09 0.09 3.07
C 0.12 4.14 -0.02 -0.82 0.09 3.31
MS1 0.26 9.39 0.22 7.82 0.48 17.21
MS2 0.21 7.50 0.09 3.19 0.30 10.69
MS3 0.04 1.56 0.16 5.58 0.20 7.14
MS4 -0.04 -1.50 0.67 24.07 0.63 22.56
NMS 0.06 2.10 0.53 18.89 0.59 20.99
Total 1.61 57.47 1.19 42.53 2.80 100
Table 6: Shift-share analysis, ITA
Sector PGE %PGE SE %SE TE %TE
AG 0.10 3.94 -0.07 -2.83 0.03 1.11
EN 0.19 7.54 -0.26 -10.6 -0.08 -3.06
MI1 0.05 2.17 -0.03 -1.35 0.02 0.82
MI2 0.64 25.71 -0.31 -12.4 0.33 13.31
MI3 0.07 2.92 0 -0.04 0.07 2.87
MI4 0.22 8.67 -0.1 -3.96 0.12 4.71
MI5 0.10 4.10 -0.01 -0.29 0.09 3.81
MI6 0.12 5.00 -0.03 -1.17 0.10 3.83
C 0.04 1.81 0 -0.18 0.04 1.63
MS1 0.29 11.78 0.16 6.26 0.45 18.04
MS2 0.14 5.73 0.09 3.50 0.23 9.23
MS3 0.04 1.71 0.21 8.31 0.25 10.02
MS4 -0.09 -3.8 0.67 26.97 0.57 23.17
NMS -0.04 -1.44 0.30 11.95 0.26 10.51
Total 1.88 75.82 0.6 24.18 2.48 100
Table 7: Shift-share analysis, LOM
34Data in Tables 6-10 are average annual growth rates, obtained by dividing the growth rates over the
period by the period length. This simplyfies the computation, but introduces a slight bias in the reported
values. The term TE indicates the Total Effect.
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Sector PGE %PGE SE %SE TE %TE
AG 0.46 15.78 -0.47 -16.30 -0.02 -0.52
EN -0.01 -0.52 0.05 1.87 0.04 1.35
MI1 0.05 1.73 -0.01 -0.45 0.04 1.28
MI2 0.14 4.76 0.13 4.44 0.27 9.20
MI3 0.10 3.36 0.01 0.34 0.11 3.70
MI4 0.08 2.85 -0.01 -0.22 0.08 2.63
MI5 0.02 0.7 0.01 0.24 0.03 0.93
MI6 0.06 2.08 0.01 0.35 0.07 2.43
C 0.15 5.10 -0.03 -1.08 0.12 4.02
MS1 0.25 8.74 0.28 9.54 0.53 18.28
MS2 0.22 7.63 0.09 3.26 0.31 10.88
MS3 0.04 1.40 0.16 5.41 0.20 6.81
MS4 -0.12 -4.13 0.67 23.34 0.55 19.21
NMS 0.04 1.47 0.53 18.32 0.57 19.79
Total 1.47 50.96 1.42 49.04 2.89 100
Table 8: Shift-share analysis, SOUTH
Sector PGE %PGE SE %SE TE %TE
AG 0.56 17.52 -0.54 -17.16 0.01 0.36
EN -0.01 -0.46 0.10 3.10 0.08 2.64
MI1 0.06 1.81 -0.01 -0.35 0.05 1.46
MI2 0.16 5.07 0.17 5.43 0.33 10.51
MI3 0.10 3.07 0.03 0.92 0.13 3.99
MI4 0.10 3.07 0.01 0.16 0.10 3.23
MI5 0.02 0.69 0.01 0.38 0.03 1.06
MI6 0.07 2.24 0.02 0.68 0.09 2.93
C 0.15 4.67 -0.02 -0.70 0.13 3.97
MS1 0.25 8.02 0.28 8.86 0.54 16.88
MS2 0.21 6.66 0.12 3.78 0.33 10.44
MS3 0.07 2.10 0.16 4.93 0.22 7.03
MS4 -0.12 -3.86 0.67 21.26 0.55 17.41
NMS 0.05 1.42 0.53 16.69 0.57 18.11
Total 1.65 52.02 1.52 47.98 3.17 100
Table 9: Shift-share analysis, SOUTH*
Sector PGE %PGE SE %SE TE %TE
AG 0.37 12.11 -0.36 -11.91 0.01 0.19
EN 0.07 2.24 0.07 2.36 0.14 4.60
MI1 0.03 1.03 0 0.15 0.04 1.18
MI2 0.06 2.04 0.03 0.94 0.09 2.97
MI3 0.11 3.48 -0.08 -2.64 0.03 0.84
MI4 0.02 0.58 -0.01 -0.41 0.01 0.17
MI5 0.03 1.12 -0.02 -0.55 0.02 0.56
MI6 0.06 1.94 -0.03 -0.85 0.03 1.09
C 0.21 6.77 -0.05 -1.67 0.16 5.10
MS1 0.41 13.45 0.09 2.99 0.50 16.44
MS2 0.25 8.29 0.05 1.74 0.31 10.04
MS3 -0.03 -0.90 0.18 5.86 0.15 4.95
MS4 -0.27 -8.76 0.91 29.87 0.65 21.11
NMS 0.08 2.64 0.86 28.12 0.94 30.76
Total 1.41 46.02 1.65 53.98 3.06 100
Table 10: Shift-share analysis, SIC
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From Tables 6-10 we note that:
1. the highest values for productivity growth is found in SOUTH*.
2. The value for Sicily is higher than the national value.35
3. Productivity growth in Sicily is based by about 54% on reallocation of workers across
sectors. This stands in sharp contrast with ITA e LOM, and the value is in any case
higher the one computed for SOUTH and SOUTH*. Productivity gains, therefore,
play a distinctly weaker role in Sicily than in the other regions and macroregions
considered.36
4. A relevant part of increases in productivity, about 28%, in Sicily has to be ascribed
to the reallocation of workers to the public sector. This value is again very different
from that of ITA e LOM and is considerably higher than the one computed for
SOUTH and SOUTH*.37
From this analysis, therefore, the productivity performance of Sicily has to be re-
assessed for at least two reasons. Firstly, productivity in strict sense has a stagnant dy-
namics, which suggests the likely presence of a low technological level of Sicilian firms.38
Secondly, the public sector, when representing an important source of jobs in a period
of strong structural change as the one under investigation here, may bias the datum on
overall productivity growth. Value added in the public sector is essentially measured by
salaries, and therefore it may not reflect actual productivity gains based on technology,
human capital, etc.39
35This, however, did not allow Sicily to fill the initial productivity gap, as shown in Figure 2.
36Note in particular the contribution of MI2 in LOM, highlightning the importance of the metal ma-
chinery sector for productivity, even in an economy facing an overall reduction of the manufacturing
sector.
37In general, NMS provide smaller contributions to productivity than some market services. The latter,
however, give mixed contributions, as Tables 6-10 show.
38Clearly, productivity is in principle determined by several variables, besides technology: the capital
stock, the level of competition, the availability of human capital, etc. A thourough analysis of this issue,
however, is beyond the scope of the present work.
39In addition, as Alesina et al. (2001) show, approximately 50% of public employment in Southern
regions can be interpreted as redistribution from other regions. This confirms that the measure of
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Since having a low technological level has been indicated as a factor which may favor
criminal organizations, in Table 11 we provide further elements to assess the technological
level of Sicilian firms.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
abs rel abs rel abs rel abs rel abs rel abs rel abs rel abs rel
ITA 0.28 1 0.42 1 0.52 1 1.78 1 2.08 1 73.8 1 68.70 1 46.80 1
LOM 0.52 1.89 0.87 2.09 1.00 1.93 4.22 2.38 4.68 2.25 89.00 1.21 86.20 1.25 63.60 1.36
SOUTH 0.13 0.48 0.20 0.49 0.28 0.53 0.81 0.46 0.95 0.46 NA NA NA NA NA NA
SOUTH* 0.14 0.51 0.21 0.51 0.28 0.54 0.78 0.44 0.90 0.43 71.13 0.96 75.03 1.09 47.47 1.01
SIC 0.13 0.47 0.22 0.52 0.31 0.6 0.92 0.52 1.10 0.62 62.50 0.85 51.10 0.74 28.7 0.61
Table 11: Indicators of technological level. Keys: 1) R&D workers/private sector employment; 2)
R&D expenditure/total regional GVA; 3) R&D expenditure/private sector regional GVA; 4) R&D ex-
penditure/total regional fixed gross investments; 5) R&D expenditure/private sector regional fixed gross
investments; 6) % of firms with at least one PC; 7) % of firms with at least one internet connection;
8) % of firms with at least one server. Indicators are expressed in absolute (“abs”) and relative (“rel”)
values with respect to national average. Data for columns 1)-5) are from ISTAT and refer to the period
2002-2003. Data for columns 6)-8) are from Confcommercio (2007) and refer to 2006.
The values in Table 11, referred to recent years,40 show that, if we measure the tech-
nological level of firms by their R&D intensity, values for Sicily do not differ much from
values for SOUTH and SOUTH* which, altogether, appear strikingly far from the values
of ITA and, especially, LOM. However, when we measure the technological level by the
penetration of Information and Communication technologies, here proxied by the use of
PCs, internet and servers, we note that Sicilian firms have a much lower technological
level than firms in SOUTH*.41
However, since R&D is not necessarily a good proxy for the technological level of the
aggregate productivity in a Southern region such as Sicily may not reflect an actual capacity to generate
value added locally.
40The choice of this period is dictated by the availability of data.
41Data are from Confcommercio (2007) and refer to a survey conducted on firms with less than 50
employees, active in the sectors of Wholesale and Retail trade, Public Establishment and Services. With
the available data, it was not possible to compute the value for SOUTH, while the value for SOUTH* has
been computed considering: ABR, MOL and SAR. I am very grateful to Andreas Schwalm from Assintel
for providing me with the data.
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firms, in particular small firms,42 and data on ICT penetration are not complete, as a
further variable providing information on firms’ technological level, we consider in Table
12 data on exports.
8 9
abs rel abs rel
ITA 18.73 1 23.44 1
LOM 30.17 1.61 34.69 1.48
SOUTH 11.56 0.62 15.63 0.67
SOUTH* 15.70 0.84 21.01 0.90
SIC 7.91 0.42 11.40 0.49
Table 12: Exports at regional level. Keys: 8) exports/total regional GVA; 9) export/private sector
regional GVA. Indicators are expressed in absolute and relative values with respect to national average
(indicated by “abs” and “rel’). Data are from ISTAT and refer to the period 2002-2004.
The capacity to export is recognized as a good indicator of overall firms’ quality, which
includes their technological level. As Bernard and Jensen (1999), pp. 2-3, succinctly
point out: “Good firms become exporters ... exporters are larger, more productive, more
capital-intensive, more technology intensive, and pay higher wages”. Table 12 shows that
the capacity of Sicilian firms to export is dramatically lower not only than the Italian
average and LOM, but also than SOUTH and SOUTH*. Table 13 reports the results of
regressions carried out to check the statistical significance of these differences.
42See, e.g., Sterlacchini (1999). Other possible measures include the purchase of innovative capital,
expenditures on design, engineering and post-production.
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I II III IV V VI VII
intercept 19.296
(2.346)
*** 23.504
(2.531)
*** 23.504
(2.410)
*** 4.9831
(3.9525)
10.5011
(6.1222)
11.7040
(7.3685)
−68.7183
(29.1346)
**
SIC −11.387
(10.494)
−4.175
(9.372)
SOUTH −11.420
(4.169)
** −5.3418
(4.5588)
SOUTHC −16.084
(4.819)
*** −7.0030
(7.0719)
SOUTH* −7.799
(4.819)
−4.9016
(4.8904)
FINDEP 0.3918
(0.1011)
*** 0.2954
(0.1295)
** 0.2681
(0.1591)
GVA 11.3554
(4.2557)
**
GVA2 −0.3433
(0.1475)
**
no. obs 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
adj R2 0.01 0.27 0.34 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.42
Table 13: Correlates of export propensity. Dependent variable: exports/total GVA (average 2002-2004).
SOUTH is a dummy for southern regions, including Sicily; SOUTHC is a dummy for southern regions
where organized crime is pervasive; SOUTH* is a dummy for southern regions where organized crime
is not pervasive; GVA is average per capita GVA in 2002-04; GVA2 is GVA squared; FINDEP is the
measure of regional financial development proposed by Guiso et al. (2004). The symbols *,**,*** denote
significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.
Models I-III in Table 13 show that the export propensity in Southern regions is sig-
nificantly lower than the intercept, although Sicily does not feature a specific difference.
However, as shown in Model III, this difference appears essentially ascribable to South-
ern regions where organized crime is pervasive, as the coefficient for SOUTH* regions is
marginally significant (the p-value for SOUTH* in Model III is 12%).43 When we control
for financial development,44 the dummies assume the expected sign but become non sig-
nificant. Finally, per capita GVA still appears as a strong correlate of export propensity,
albeit in a nonliner fashion.45
Overall, we found that firms where organized crime is pervasive, are likely to have a low
technological level, although the small dataset used and the results from the consideration
43The p-value of a test of equality of the coefficients for SOUTH* and SOUTHC is 18%.
44On the assumption that where financial development is high, firms are may increase their “quality”
and are more likely to become exporters.
45No dummies turned out to be significant in presence of per capita GVA.
25
of correlates such as financial development suggest some caution. This is consistent with
the prediction that organized crime may more likely spread where the technological level
of the firms is low. Moreover, as long as this is associated to a low export propensity, it
can also have a bearing on the issue of the demand for protection, as we discuss in Section
4.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we studied an aspect so far overlooked in explanations of the diffusion and
persistence of organized crime. We refer to the structure of the economy, on the hypothesis
that, where the economy has certain characteristics, organized crime can spread more
easily. The main result is that the structure of the Sicilian economy has features that
represent favorable preconditions for the intrusion of organized crime in the economic
activity. This constitutes an alternative to explanations of organized crime based on
cultural and social factors.
In particular, the Sicilian economy appears characterized by:
1. a relatively high dimension of traditional sectors, such as the Construction sector,
whose activity has a high degree of territorial specificity;
2. a distribution of firms’ size relatively skewed towards small firms;
3. a relatively low technological level;
4. a relatively large dimension of the public sector.
In Section 3.2.1 we showed that, in terms of employment shares dynamics, there
emerges a specificity for the Sicilian economy which is robust to various controls. Instead,
using a much smaller database, in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 we have identified some statis-
tically significant differences between Southern regions as a group and the rest of Italy. In
particular, Southern regions where organized crime is not widespread do indeed present
characteristics that make them less permeable, although the results on variables such as
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the level of financial development suggest that the picture is likely to be more compli-
cated. However, we believe that analyses of organized crime, in particular of its diffusion
and persistence, should include the consideration for the structure of the economy.46
The analysis has been conducted assuming a direction of causality going from the
economic structure to organized crime, although, for the reasons explained, we resorted
to the identification of robust correlations to support this idea. However, it is certainly
true that causality may also run in the opposite direction, producing a vicious circle of
persistent organized crime activities, and of low economic development.
This would occur if, in presence of organized crime, the economic structure endoge-
nously became biased toward shapes more favorable to criminal organizations. Part of the
results in this paper could already be interpreted in this sense. For example, the presence
of organized crime may cause firms to remain small and not to invest in technology be-
cause of the risk of expropriation by the Mafia, and the low level of competition generated
by the Mafia may further reduce stimuli to innovate. In addition, when firms are focused
on local instead of foreign markets, as we showed is the case in Sicily and in the other
“crime” regions, this may increase firms’ incentives to buy protection in order to become
or remain insulated from internal competition.47
Furthermore, the economic structure of Sicily and, possibly, of the other regions where
organized crime is widespread, is likely to be associated to low economic growth as the
latter depends, as almost universally recognized, on technological progress and human
capital. In other words, Sicily could be trapped in locally stable low-income equilibrium,
typically defined “poverty trap” (see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp.74-77) with
feedbacks going from the economic structure to organized crime and vice versa.
Among the directions of further research we can list: (i) a thourough analysis aiming
at identifying causal relationships between the structure of the economy, the presence of
organized crime and other indicators of economic development; (ii) a corroboration of the
results in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 which, in the present paper, have been obtained with a
small dataset.
46For an economic explanation of the origins of organized crime in Sicily, see Bandiera (2003).
47I owe this remark to Federico Varese.
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A Regions and Sectors’ List
Regions Sectors
# Key Region # Key Sector
1 PIE Piedmont ITA CN 1 AG Agriculture
2 VDA Aosta Valley ITA CN 2 EN Mining, fuel and power products and chemical products
3 LOM Lombardy ITA CN 3 MI1 Minerals and non-metallic mineral products
4 TAA Trentino-Alto Adige ITA CN 4 MI2 Metal products and machinery and transport equipment
5 VEN Veneto ITA CN 5 MI3 Food, beverages, tobacco
6 FVG Friuli Venezia Giulia ITA CN 6 MI4 Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
7 LIG Liguria ITA CN 7 MI5 Paper, and printing products
8 EMR Emilia Romagna ITA CN 8 MI6 Wood, rubber and other industrial products
9 TOS Tuscany ITA CN 9 C Building and construction sector
10 UMB Umbria ITA CN 10 MS1 Trade, hotels and public establishment
11 MAR Marche ITA CN 11 MS2 Transport and communication services
12 LAZ Lazio ITA CN 12 MS3 Credit and insurance institutions
13 ABR Abruzzo ITA SOUTH SOUTH* 13 MS4 Other market services
14 MOL Molise ITA SOUTH SOUTH* 14 NMS Non-market services
15 CAM Campania ITA SOUTH
16 PUG Apulia ITA SOUTH
17 BAS Basilicata ITA SOUTH SOUTH*
18 CAL Calabria ITA SOUTH
19 SAR Sardinia ITA SOUTH SOUTH*
20 SIC Sicily
Table 14: Regions and Sectors’ list. Regions are referred to one of the macroregions (ITA, CN, SOUTH, SOUTH*)
32
